On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit | 
 enlarge | Author: George C. Edwards Iii
Publisher: Yale University Press
Category: Book
List Price: $40.00
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Avg. Customer Rating:  2 reviews
Sales Rank: 1401085
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 320
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.3
Dimensions (in): 9.7 x 6.3 x 0.9
ISBN: 0300100094
Dewey Decimal Number: 320.973014
EAN: 9780300100099
ASIN: 0300100094
Publication Date: November 1, 2003
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Condition: Crisp, clean, unread & unmarked hardcover with light shelfwear to the dust jacket - NICE
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Product Description
American presidents often engage in intensive campaigns to obtain public support for their policy initiatives. This core strategy for governing is based on the premise that if presidents are skilled enough to exploit the "bully pulpit," they can successfully persuade or even mobilize public opinion on behalf of their legislative goals. In this book, George Edwards analyzes the results of hundreds of public opinion polls from recent presidencies to assess the success of these efforts. Surprisingly, he finds that presidents typically are not able to change public opinion; even great communicators usually fail to obtain the public's support for their high-priority initiatives. Focusing on presidents' personae, their messages, and the American public, he explains why presidents are often unable to move public opinion and suggests that their efforts to do so may be counterproductive. Edwards argues that shoring up previously existing support is the principal benefit of going public and that "staying private"- negotiating quietly with elites-may often be more conducive to a president's legislative success.
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 Great Political Science research November 29, 2007
This book represents a wonderful work of political science. I use it in my graduate seminar on the Presidency. Edwards uses solid empirical evidence from the Reagan and Clinton Presidencies to solidly dismiss the conventional wisdom which suggests the powers of the bully pulpit provide the President with substantial power. For a more contemporary and light version of this same argument I would suggests Edwards other work, Governing by Campaigning.
 Fascinating Topic September 6, 2006
When the president addresses the nation, is he able to persuade? According to Edwards, the answer is, "No."
Edwards uses poll data; he includes a study of numerous presidential initiatives that were accompanied at the time by poll data on public opinions. Hence, he compares presidential approval ratings from before a speech to those taken after the speech; opinions on a national issue over time, accompanied by presidential campaigns on that issue; and some surveys based on political affiliation. From this, he argues that presidential efforts seldom had an impact.
He scrolls through some case histories: Reagan, Clinton, and George Washington as separate examples of presidents who were (1) conservative "communicators," (2) liberal "communicators," and (3) enjoyed personal veneration. Arguably none of these figures effectively molded public opinion.
He turns to methods used, and how these methods were embraced, then abandoned, by individual administrations. It becomes clear that choice of technology follows campaigning fashion and initiatives from the opposition. Using the above-mentioned metrics, he concludes these are reliably neutralized by competition for the public's attention. Gradually he turns to the theoretical literature, comparing the empirical support for different understandings of how the presidency can affect public perceptions.
Occasionally Edwards' rightward bias damages his analysis, however. For example, he never admits the possibility that there were holes in Reagan's allegedly simple, conservative "philosophy"; the immense power of industrial lobbying groups used to take down Clinton's moderate health care plan is not even mentioned. Instead, while Reagan failed to win public support for what amounted to a terrorist campaign waged against Latin American countries (e.g., the contras)--which Edwards bemoans--Clinton's efforts to reform the dystopian US health system were centrally and mendaciously attacked by a well-documented industry lobby. Edwards chalks that up to the plan being bad, and opposed by "centrists" in Congress.
While striving to appear impartial, Edwards excludes the powerful role of industry lobbying groups, whose force in politics consistently favors the right. He seems to be arguing that there are too many forces that influence public opinion for there to be successful White House campaigns for or against a particular issue; this is, I believe, meant to be reassuring. But he excludes entirely the most important part of the story: that the president has increasingly become part of the media. Since the corporate-controlled press has captured Congress and the White House entirely, it's erroneous to actually measure different messages from the White House as if they represented changes in direction. In reality, the consistency of public opinions reflects a constant media barrage directed towards the same object: monopoly control over national policy.
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